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166 BEAGLE V. VASOLD [65 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 28909. In Bank. Aug. 31,1966.] 
CARL BEAGJ.lE,Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELIZABETH 
V ASOLD et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Damages-Measure-Physical and Mental Su1fering.-Trans-
lating pain and anguish into dollars can be only an arbitrary 
allowance, not a process of measurement. 
[2] Id.-Instructions-Physical Suffering.-In instructing on dam-
ages for pain and anguish, a judge can give the jury no 
standard to go by; he can only tell the jury to allow such 
amount as in their discretion they may consider reasonable. 
[3] Id.-Measure-Physical and Mental Suffering.-In attempting 
to value· suffering in terms of money, the chief reliance for 
reaching reasonable results must be the restraint and common 
sense of the jury. 
[4] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-
Argument of Oounsel- Scope - Reading Pleadings. - In an 
action .to recover damages for personal injury involving pain 
and suffering, an attorney may read the complaint, including 
the prayer, to the jury. 
[fi1 Id.-Instructions.-In an action to recover damages, the trial 
court may instruct the jury that plaintiff ~laims a certain 
amount as damages in his complaint and that no more than 
this sum may be awarded. . 
[6] Id.-Measure-Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-Argu-
ment of Oounsel-Scope.-In an action to recover damages for 
personal injuries involving pain and suffering, plaintiff's 
counsel may argue for a per diem allowance for such suffer-
ing. 
[7] Id.-Evidence: Trial-Argument of Oounsel.-Although argu-
ment of counsel does not constitute evidence of damage, it does 
not follow that counsel's suggestion of a sum for damages can 
have no foundation in the evidence. 
[8] Trial-Argument of Oounsel-Scope.-During argument, an 
attorney is permitted to discuss all reasonable inferences from 
the evidence. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Damages, § 61; [2, 18, 19] Dam-
ages, § 205; [4] Damages, § 61; Trial, § 52; [5] Damages, § 198; 
[6, 20-22, 24, 25] Damages, § 61; Trial, § 50 (1); [7] Damages, 
§188; Trial, §33(1); [8,23] Trial, 50(1); [9] Damages, §189; 
Trial, § 50(1); [10] Damages, § 18; Trial, § 50(1); [11] Damages, 
§ 205; Trial, § 50(1); [12] Damages, § 197; [13] Damages, §§ 86, 
87,213; [14] Damages, §94; [15] Damages, §213; Trial, §50(1); 
[16] Damages, §§ 86, 87; [17] Damages, § 85; Trial, § 50(1); [26] 
Damages, § 109; [27] Damages, § 87. 
') 
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[9] Damages-Evidence-Personal Injury Cases: Trial-Argument 
of Counsel-Scope.-An attorney who suggests to the jury that 
his client's damages for pain and suffering be calculated on a 
per diem basis is not presenting evidence but is merely drawing 
. an inference from the evidence given at the trial. 
[10] ld.-Oompensatory Damages-Speculative Damages: Trial-
Argument of Counsel-Scope.-The trial court has the power 
and duty to contain argument within legitimate bounds and 
may preyent an attorney from drawing inferences unwar-
ranted by the evidence; and counsel should not be permitted to 
argue future damages for pain and suffering on a per diem 
basis where the evidence would not justify an inference that 
plaintiff will suffer pain in the future. 
[11] ld.-Instructions-Physical Suffering: Trial-Argument of 
Counsel-Scope.-Where counsel asserts in argument that 
compensation for pain and suffering should be measured on a 
per diem basis, it should not be concluded as a matter of 
law that the jury will ignore the court's instruction to award a 
reasonable amount for plaintiff's pain and suffering and that 
the jury will inevitably choose an indefensible course of' 
slavishly following counsel's suggestions on damages. 
[12] ld.-Province of Court and Jury.-In an action to recover 
damages for personal injury involving pain and suffering, the 
jury is the ultimate judge of the inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence presented, and the jury is so instructed by the 
court. 
[13] Id.-Excessive Damages-Power of 'l'rial Court: Power of 
Appellate Courts: Verdict.-Both the trial and appellate courts 
have the power and duty to reduce verdicts for unreasonably 
large damages, and even if it can be established that larger 
verdicts result on occasions when counsel employ an argument 
for a per diem allowance for pain and suffering, it does not 
necessarily follow that these awards are excessive under the 
circumstances of the particular cases. 
[14] Id.-Test of Excessive Verdict.-A verdict for damages is not 
excessive as a matter of law where the amount awarded is 
identical to the sum suggested by plaintiff's counsel. 
[16] Id. - Verdict: Trial - Argument of Oounsel - Scope.-
Whatever manner of calculation is proposed by counselor 
employed by the jury to determine damages for pain and 
suffering, the verdict must meet the test of reasonableness. An 
argument for a per diem allowance for pain and suffering is 
only a suggestion as to one method of reaching the goal of 
reasonableness, not a substitute for it. 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 151; Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 105; 
CalJur.2d, Trial, § 94; Am.Jur., Trial (1st ed § 485). 
) 
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[16] Id.-Excessive Damages-Power of Trial Court: Power of 
Appellate Court.-Where a jury's award for pain and suffering 
does not meet the test of reasonableness, the trial court has 
the duty to reduce it, and the appellate court has the authority 
to review the result. 
[17] Id. - Excessive Damages: Trial- Argument of Counsel-
Scope.-In· an action to recover damages, plaintiff's counsel 
assumes the risk of overpersuasion, and where he overstates 
his claim there is nothing to prevent defense counsel from 
pointing out this strategem or to argue that the amount 
suggested is excessive and emphasize the jury's duty to award 
only a reasonable sum as compensation. 
[18] Id.-Instruction-Physical Suffering.-A trial court can and 
should instruct the jury that argument of counsel as to the 
amount of damages claimed by plaintiff is not evidence and· 
that the jury's duty is only to award such damages as will 
,. reasonably compensate plaintiff for his pain and suffering. 
[19] Id.-Instructions-Physical Su1fering.-When deemed appro-
priate, the trial court may advise the jury it is not bound by 
any particular method of calculating damages for pain and 
suffering. 
[20] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-
Argument of Counsel - Scope. - In an action to recover 
damages for personal injury involving pain and suffering, 
argumellt for a per diem allowance for pain and suffering 
provides a more explicit comprehension and humanization o~ 
plaintiff's predicament to lay jurors, and such argument is an; 
effective tool in the hands of plaintiff's attorney. However, this 
alone is not sufficient reason to condemn such argument. . 
[21] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-
Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Argument for a per diem 
allowance for pain and suffering is not beneficial exclusively to 
plaintiffs seeking damages; such argument is equally available 
to and of equal utility to defense counsel who may employ the 
technique to divide plaintiff's total demand into time segments 
to illustrate how exaggerated or ludicrous the claim may be. 
[22] Id. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-
Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Denial of argument for a per 
diem allowance for pain and suffering deprives counsel of the 
full fruits of effective advocacy on the issue of damages, which 
is frequently the crucial confl.ict in the trial of a personal 
injury action. 
[23] Trial-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Only the most per-
suasive reasons justify handcuffing attorneys in the exercise of 
their advocacy within the bounds of propriety. 
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 229; Am.Jur.2d, DamageS, 
§ 338. 
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[24] Damages-Measure-Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-
Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Though plaintiff's counsel may 
properly suggest to a jury that plaintiff's paiu and suffering be 
measured on a per diem basis, this rule does not imply 
approval of the so-called "golden rule" argument, by which 
counsel asks the jury to place themselves in plaintiff's shoes 
and to award such damages as they would charge to undergo 
equivalent pain and suffering. 
[26] ld. - Measure - Physical and Mental Suffering: Trial-
Argument of Oounsel-Scope.-Existing rules for the trial 
court's control over the scope of counsel's argument sufficiently 
protect the integrity of the jury's decision-making role as to 
the damages allowable for pain and suffering, and there is no 
justification for holding that an argument for a per diem 
allowance for pain and suffering is governed by special 
standards not applicable to other types of argument. 
[26] ld.-lnadequate Damages.-It was reasonably probable that a 
result more favorable to plaintiff would have been reached had 
the trial court permitted counsel to argue for a per diem 
allowance for pain and suffering where the jury verdict allowed 
only $342 more than the medical expenses incurred prior to 
trial though plaintiff, a carpenter, 39 years old at the time of 
the accident, suffered cuts to his head and hands, a chipped 
front tooth, impaired vision, severe back pains radiating down 
his thighs to the knees, and though, as a result of the accident, 
he was required to wear glasses, a back brace, and had been 
unable to work in his trade as a carpenter. 
[27] ld.-Inadequate Damages-Oonsideration by Appellate Oourt. 
. -In a personal injury case, where the evidence of liability is 
in sharp and substantial conflict and the damages awarded are 
so grossly inadequate as to indicate a compromise on the issues 
of liability and damages, the case should be remanded for 
retrial of both issues. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Bonsall Noon, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident. Judgment for plaintiff awarding allegedly 
inadequate damages reversed. 
Rubin, Seltzer & Solomon and Richard I. Singer for Plain-
tiff and Appellant. 
Edward I. Pollock, Theodore A. Horn, Richard L. Oliver, 
Robert G. Beloud; Robert E. Cartwright, Neil D. Heily ana 
Edward L. Lascher as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
.• ~ 
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Higgs, Fletcher & Mack, Edward M. Wright and Dan E. 
Hedin for Defendants and Respondents. 
Parker, Stanbury, }tIcGee, Peckham & Garrett, Crider, 
Tilson & Ruppe, Betts & Loomis, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly 
and Jean Wunderlich as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants 
and Respondents. 
MOSK. J.-Plaintiff brought an action against defendants 
for personal injuries suffered by him as the result of an 
automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict in his favor 
in the sum of $1,719.48, and he appeals from the judgment 
entered thereon, contending that the damages awarded are 
inadequate as a matter of law. The only issue raised on this 
appeal by any of the parties, including amici curiae, is 
whether the trial court erred in prohibiting plaintiff's counsel 
from stating in argument to the jury the amount of general 
damages claimed by plaintiff, either in terms of a total sum or 
of a sum for a time segment. We conclude it was error to 
restrict counsel's arguments in that regard. 
Plaintiff's injuries resulted from an accident in which a car 
driven by Kenneth Vasold went over an embankment while 
rounding a curve in the road. Vasold died as a result of his 
injuries. Plaintiff and two o~her occupants of the car, Beverly 
Adams, and Vasold's wife, i Elizabeth, were injured. l In the 
complaint, plaintiff prayed for $61,025.18 in general damages, 
as well as compensation for medical expenses, loss of earnings, 
and costs of suit. 
The trial court informed plaintiff's attorney in chambers 
that he would not be permitted to mention to the jury "the 
value of his action in dollars" in a lump sum or as to "any 
per diem damages such as so many dollars per day, or so many 
dollars per month" because" [S]uch is not evidence."2 In 
lThe defendants in this action are Elizabeth Vasold and the adminis-
trator of Vasold's estate. 
2The following colloquy occurred between plaintiff's attorney and 
the court during the opening statement: 
"MR. SINGER: I want to talk just very briefly with you about the 
amount of money in controversy in this case. Before I do, I remember 
your Honor's admonition in chambers j that did not apply 'to opening 
statements, is that correct, your Honorf 
"THE COURT: Yes. At all times. 
"MR. SINGER: At all times, your Honor' 
I I THE COURT: Yes. Except as to your special. 
I I MR. SINGER: Oh, I see. 
I I THE COURT: But as to the general. 
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accordance with this request, counsel confined his arguments 
on the question of damages to the amount of past and antici-
pated medical expenses and loss of earnings, a description of 
plaintiff's injuries, and general statements to the effect that 
plaintiff was entitled to recover for past and future pain and 
suffering resulting from the accident.s Plaintiff's medical 
expenses up to the time of trial were $1,377.48, and his total 
claim for special damages was $21,502.48. Thus the jury's 
verdict of $1,719.48 amounts to $342 more than the medical 
expenses incurred prior to trial. His motion for a new trial on 
the ground of inadequacy of the damages was denied by the 
trial court. 
On this appeal, it is contended that the trial court's action 
in restricting the argument of counsel on the issue of general 
damages was erroneous and that the error was prejudicial. 
Prior to the summation. the court and counsel discussed the scope 
of permissible argument in chambers as follows: 
"THE COURT: My suggestion to counsel is that during tlleir summa-
tion that no calculations be made, either verbally or on the blackboard, 
of any per diem damages such as so many dollars per day; or so many 
dollars per month. Further, that the opinion of counsel not be given 
as to the value of his ac~ion in dollars. Such is not evidence. 
"M&. SINGER: If I understand the Court's instructions on this point, 
I am then permitted to talk in specific figures about the special damages, 
the medical damages' 
"THE COURT: No question about that. 
"MR. SINGER: And the loss of wages-but not about the estimated 
future loss of wages-in terms of specific :figures. I may do so, 
"THE CoURT: Yes. That is special. This only applies to general 
damages. 
"MR. SINGER: I see. Then I may only not speak in t.erms of :figures 
as to the amount to be awarded to my clients, if there is an award, for 
permanent disability and for pain and suffering; is that generally cor-
rect! 
, 'THE COURT: This is my request: That counsel not tell the jury that 
in his opinion the general damages are worth $50,000 or $40.000, or $2;). 
Of course, as to your special. naturally those are :fixed amounts. Tht'y 
have been test.ified to and they are in the evidence; but there is nothing 
in the evidence whatsoever of any amount of general damages. Do you 
understand each onet 
"MR. SINGER: Yes." 
aWith regard to the question of general damages, plaintiff's attorney 
stated in closing argument: "Mr. Beagle's vision, of course. was affected 
by the accident. His life expectancy is 30.5 years (writing). And he 
is entitled to an award based on the permanent disability that he will 
incur as the result of this accident. And, of course, an award for the 
pain and sutTering which be incurred as t.he result of t.his accident and 
will incur in the future. You will recall Mr. Beagle was in the hospital 
13 days. He, of course, was injured in the accident with severe head 
lacerations, and has worn a corset-type brace for the last two years as 
the result of the accident.. You are entitled to take these things into 
consideration as far as pain and ButTering, and the pain and sutTering 
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One of the most difficult tasks imposed upon a jury in decid. 
ing a case involving personal injuries is to determine the 
amount of money the plaintiff is to be awarded as compensa-
tion for pain and suffering. No method is available to the jury 
by which it can objectively evaluate such damages, and' no 
witness may express his subjective opinion on the matter. (See 
7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 944, pp. 55-56.) In a'· 
very real sense, the jury is asked to evaluate in terms of 
money a detriment for which monetary compensation cannot 
be ascertained with any demonstrable accuracy. [1, 2] As 
one writer on the subject has said, "Translating pain and 
anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allow-
ance, and not a process of measurement, and consequently the 
judge can, in his instructions, give the jury no standard to go 
by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in their 
discretion they may consider reasonable. . .. [3] The chief 
reliance for'reaching reasonable results in attempting to value 
suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common 
sense of the jury .... " (McCormick on Damages, § 88, pp. 
318-319.) 
Before turning to the question of the propriety of the so-
called "per diem" argument," it is significant to note that, 
while no case has been found specifically holding an attorney 
may inform the jury as to the total amount of the general 
damages sought by the plaintiff, there is a clear implication 
that such a statement may be made by an attorney, and 
defendants here do not seriously challenge plaintiff's assertion 
that the trial court erred in limiting counsel's argument in 
this regard. 
It has long been a courtroom practice of attorneys in this 
state to tell the jury the total amount of damages the plaintiff 
seeks, and no questioning of the technique has come to our 
attention. (See dissenting opinion of Carter, J., in Sanguinetti 
v. Moore Dry Dock Co. (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 812, 823, 842 [228 
P.2d 557] ; Ritzman v. MiUs (1929) 102 Cal.App. 464, 472 
[283 P. 88].) [4] Moreover, an attorney may and frequently 
does read the complaint, including the prayer, to the jury. 
(Knight v. Russ (1888) 77 Cal. 410, 414-415 [19 P. 698] ; see 
Ritzman v Mills, supra, at p. 472.) [5] Finally, the trial 
court may instruct the jury that the plaintiff claims a certain 
"This term will be used in the opinion to refer to argument by 
counsel which suggests the segmentation of the damages to be allowed 
for pain and suffering into a stated amount of money representing a cer-
tain period of time, such as $5 for each day, etc. . 
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amount as damages in his complaint and that no morc than 
this sum may be awarded. (Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock 
Co., supra, at p. 816; Lahti v. McMenamin (1928) 204 Cal. 
415, 421 [268 P. 644] ; McNulty v. Southern Pac. Co. (1950) 
96 Cal.App.2d 841,852-853 [216 P.2d 534].) In the Lahti case 
it was said that such an instruction" is usually given in negli-
gence cases, and it is difficult to understand how a jury in 
such cases can be properly instructed by the court" without a 
direction of this type. (204 Cal. at p. 421; see also BAJI Nos. 
173, 173-A, 173-B, 173-C.) On the other hand, Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey prohibit disclosure of this information to the 
jury. See Reese v. Hershey (1894) 163 Pa. 253 [29 A. 907, 43 
Am.St.Rep. 795];' Porter v. Zeuger Milk Co. (1939) 138 
Pa.Super.48 [7 A.2d 77] ; Botta v. Brunner (1958) 26 N.J. 82 
[138 A.2d 713, 725].) 
The question whether an attorney may argue to the jury 
that his client's damages for pain and suffering may be 
measured in terms of a stated number of dollars for specific 
periods of time presents a more difficult problem. Few issues 
in the area of tort law have evoked more controversy in the 
last decade. While no California case has decided the matter 
(but see dissenting opinion in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit 
Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 509 [15 Cal.Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 
337]), the controversy has been resolved in most of our sister 
states and in some federal jurisdictions. 
[6] Twenty-one jurisdictions which have passed on the 
issue permit an attorney to make the "per diem" argument. 
(Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 1966) 365 
F.2d 858; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Kines (1963) 276 
Ala. 253 [160 So.2d 869] ; Vanlandingham v. Gartman (1963) 
236 Ark. 504 [367 S.W.2d 111] ; Newbury v. Vogel (1963) 151 
Colo. 520 [379 P.2d 811]; Evening Btar Newspaper Co. v. 
Gray (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962) 179 A.2d 377; Ratner v . 
.Arrington (Fla.App. 1959) 111 So.2d 82; Southern Indiana 
Gas &7 Elec. Co. v. Bone (1962) 135 Ind.App. 531 [180 N.E.2d 
375], affd. 244 Ind. 672 [195 N.E.2d 488] ; Corkery v. Green-
berg (1962) 253 Iowa 846 [114 N.W.2d 327] ; Louisville &7 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly (Ky.App. 1960) 339 S.W.2d 
155; Little v. Hughes (La.App. 1961) 136 So.2d 448; Eastern 
Shore Public Service Co. v. Corbett (1962) 227 Md. 411 [177 
A.2d 701], affd. 180 A.2d 681; Yates v. Wenk (1961) 363 Mich. 
311 [109 N.W.2d 828] ; Flaherty v. Minneapolis &7 St. Louis 
By. Co. (1958) 251 Minn. 345 [87 N.W.2d 633] ; Arnold v. 
Ellis (1957) 231 Miss. 757 [97 So.2d 744]; Wyant v. Dunn 
.) 
) 
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(1962) 140 Mont. 181 [368 P.2d 917]; Johnson v. Brown 
(1959) 75 Nev. 437 [345 P.2d 754] ; Grossnickle v. Village of 
Germantown (1965) 3 Ohio St.2d 96 [209 N.E.2d 442]; 
Edwards v. Lawton (1964) 244 S.C. 276 [136 S.E.2d 708] ; 
Hernandez v. Baucum (Tex.Civ.App. 1961) 344 S.W.2d 498; 
Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. (1960) 11 Utah 2d 
23 [354 P.2d 575] ; Jones v. Hogan (1960) 56 Wn.2d 23 [351 
P.2d 153] ; see also Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik (6th Cir. 1956) 
234 F.2d 4.) Of these jurisdictions, Florida, Montana, Nevada, 
Utah and Washington hold that the matter rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial judge.6 
In 11 jurisdictions the argument is not permitted. (Henne v. 
Balick (1958) 51 Del. 369 [146 A.2d 394] ; Franco v. Fujimoto 
(1964) 47 Hawaii 408 [390 P.2d 740]; Caley v. Manicke 
(1962) 24 Ill.2d 390 [182 N.E.2d 206]; Caylor V. Atchison, 
Topeka &- Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1962) 190 Kan. 261 [374 P.2d 
53] ; Faught v. Washam (Mo. 1959) 329 S.W.2d 588; Duguay 
v. Gelinas (1962) 104 N.H. 182 [182 A.2d 451]; Botta v. 
Brunner (1958) supra, 138 A.2d 713; Certified T.V. &- Appli-
ance Co. v. Harrington (1959) 201 Va. 109 [109 S.E.2d 126] ; 
Crum v. Ward (1961) 146 W.Va. 421 [122 S.E.2d 18] ; Afldl 
v. Milwaukee &- Suburban Transport Corp. (1960) 11 Wis.2d 
604 [106 N.W.2d 274] ; Henman v. Klinger (Wyo. 1966) 409 
P.2d 631; see also Paley v. Brust (1964) 21 App.Div.2d 758 
[250 N.Y.S.2d 356] ; King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 
(N.D. 1961) 107 N.W.2d 509.) 
The conflict has also been thoroughly debated in the law 
reviews. An examination of a large number of articles on the 
subject indicates that a substantial majority of the authors are 
5Defendants assert that only one of the eases cited above for the 
majority view (Newbury v. Vogel (1963) supra, 379 P.2d 811) involved ---
a situation where, as here, the trial court refused to allow the "per 
diem" argument and the appellate court held the refusal erroneous, and 
that in the remainder of the eases cited for the majority view the trial 
court permitted "per diem" argument and the appellate court upheld 
the lower court's determination that such argument was proper. It 
follows, therefore, argue defendants, that the majority rule is not that 
the "per diem" argument may be made by an attorney as a matter of 
right but only that the issue is to be determined in the sound discretion 
of the trial court. This is an incorrect analysis. Some of the cases, as 
indicated above, expressly provide that the question whether to permit 
, 'per diem" argument is committed to the discretion of the trial court. 
Those which do not so state hold generally that for the reasons set forth 
in the subsequent portions of this opinion, the "per diem" argument is 
a proper one. Presumably. a refusal by the trial court to permit the 
, 'per diem" type of argument would result in a reversal of the judg-
ment in these jurisdictions it the issue were raised in the proper conUgt J 
and prejudice resulted from the refusal. 
) 
) 
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of the view that it is desirable to permit "per diem" 
argument.G (See generally favoring "per diem" argument: 
Phillips, Botta in Focus (1962) Trial Law. Guide 69; Note 
(1958) 12 Rutgers L.Rev. 522; Note (1962) 60 Mich.L.Rev. 
612; Note (1959) 43 Minn.L.Rev. 832; Note (1963) 17 
Ark.L.Rev. 94; Note (1961) 41 B.U.L.Rev. 432; Note (1961) 
38 Ohi.-Kent L.Rev. 62; Note (1959) 28 U.Cine.L.Rev. 138; 
Note (1962) 11 Clev.-Mar.L.Rev. 495; Note (1959) 36 Dicta 
373; Note (1962) Duke L.J. 344; Note (1962) 13 Hastings 
L.J. 502; Note (1962) 11 Kan.L.Rev. 170; Note (1961) 10 
Kan.L.Rev. 93; Note (1960) 38 N.C.L.Rev. 289; Note (1963) 
39 N.D.L.Rev. 209; Note (1960) 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 214; Note 
(1962) 14 S. C.L. Q. 442; generally dJisfavoring "per diem" 
argument: Note (1963) 12 De Paul L.Rev. 317; Note (1961) 
49 Ky.L.J. 592; Note (1962) La.L.Rev. 461; Note (1962) 23 
Ohio St. L.J. 573; Note (1963) 16 Okla.L.Rev. 468; Note 
(1962) Vand.L.Rev. 1303; Note (1958) 4 ViII.L.Rev. 137; 
Note (1962) 64 W.Va.L.Rev.237; Note (1959).61 W.Va. 
L.Rev. 302.) 
We believe the reasons hereinafter discussed persuasively 
require California to align itself with the majority of jurisdic-
tions on this issue. 
The opening guns in the battle to prohibit an attorney from 
arguing damages on a "per diem" basis were sounded in 
Botta v. Brunner (1958) supra, 138 A.2d 713, and every deci-
sion since Botta holding such argument to be improper has 
followed, at least in part, the reasoning employed in that case. 
In Botta the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the trial 
court's refusal to permit plaintiff's attorney to suggest that 
his client's damages for pain and suffering be measured by a 
stated number of dollars for each day, essentially on the 
rationale that such statements of counsel are not evidence and 
have no foundation in the evidence, but in the minds of jurors 
they substitute "unproven, speculative and fanciful standards 
of evaluation for evidence." 
The court stated: "In the final analysis, we hold the view 
that suggestions of the sort we are asked to approve here 
constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the 
jury .... 'Jurors know the nature of pain, embarrassment 
and inconvenience, and they also know the nature of money. 
GNot included in this compilation are articles from journals published 
by organizations such as the Defense Research Institute, Inc., and the 
American Trial Lawyers Association, formerly known as the National 
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Their problem of equating the two to afford reasonable and 
just compensation calls for a high order of human judgment, 
and the law has provided no better yardstick for their guid-
ance than their enlightened conscience. Their problem is not 
one of mathematical calculation but involves an exercise of 
their sound judgment of what is fair and right.' " (138 A.2d 
at p. 725.) 
With commendable forthrightness Botta overruled a long 
line of New Jersey cases which had held it proper for an 
attorney to advise the jury of the total amount of damages 
sought by the plaintiff or to suggest a total amount as reason-
able compensation, on the ground that it would be inconsistent 
to allow the jury to know the total amount of damages while 
prohibiting counsel from suggesting by means of a "per 
diem" evaluation how he arrived at the total. 
We do not find the reasoning of Botta convincing. It is, of 
course, axiomatic that pain and su.1!ering are difficult to 
measure in monetary terms. Yet the inescapable fact is that 
this is precisely what the jury is called upon to do. As one 
critic of Botta has noted: "The plaintiff sues for money. The 
defendant defends against an award of money. The jury is 
limited to expressing its findings in terms of money. Neverthe-
less, the -jury must be precluded from hearing any reference 
whatever to money. It must retire to the jury room in vacuo 
on this essential of the case where the unmentionable· and 
magical conversion from broken bones to hard cash may then 
take place." (Note (1958) supra, 12 Rutgers L.Rev. 522.) 
[7] It is undeniable that the argument of counsel does not 
constitute evidence. However, it does not follow, as averred in 
Botta, that the suggestion of a sum for damages can have no 
foundation in the evidence. Indeed it is necessarily inferred 
from observation of the plaintiff in the courtroom and from 
expert testimony regarding the nature of his injuries and their 
consequences. If the jury must infer from what it sees and 
hears at the trial that a certain amount of money is warranted 
as compensation for the plaintiff's pain and suffering, there is 
no justification for prohibiting counsel from making a similar 
deduction in argument. [8] An attorney is permitted to 
discuss all reasonable inferences from the evidence. (4-County 
Electric Power Assn. v. Clardy (1954) 221 Miss. 403 [73 So.2d 
144, 151-152, 44 A.IJ.R.2d 1191] ; J. D. Wright &- Son Truck 
Line v. Chandler (Tex.Oiv.App. 1950) 231 S.W.2d 786, 789.) 
It would be paradoxical to hold that damages in totality are 
inferable from the evidence but that when this sum is divided 
) 
) 
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into segments representing days, months or years, the infer-
ence vanishes. 
[9] Thus, an attorney who suggests that his client's 
damages for pain and suffering be calculated on a "per 
diem" basis is not presenting evidence to the jury but is 
merely drawing an inference from the evidence given at the 
trial. [10] Of course, the trial court has the power and 
duty to contain argument within legitimate bounds and it may 
prevent the attorney from drawing inferences not warranted 
by the evidence. For example, counsel should not be permitted 
to argue future damages for pain and suffering on a "per 
diem" basis where the evidence would not justify an infer-
ence that the plaintiff will suffer pain in the future. 
Another dubious aspect of Botta is its conclusion that an 
attorney who employs the "per diem" argument invades the 
province of the jury. It seems patently clear that an attorney 
does not interfere with a jury's tlecision-making powers to 
any greater extent when he suggests that damages be measured 
on a segmented basis than when he exhorts the jury to find the 
defendant negligent. It has never been contended that the jury 
forsakes its duty of determining whether the defendant acted 
as a reasonable man because counsel is permitted to discuss the 
participants' conduct and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. [11] Nor should we conclude as a matter of law 
that a jury will ignore the court's instructions to award a 
reasonable amount as compensation for the plaintUf's pain 
and suffering and that it will inevitably choose an indefensible 
course of slavishly following counSel's suggestions on dam-
ages, merely because he asserts in argument that such com-
pensation"should be measured on a "per diem" basis. [12] The 
jury is, in any event, the ultimate judge of the inferences to 
be drawn from the evidence presented and it is so instructed 
by the court. 
Many of the authorities, including Botta, point out that it is 
logically inconsistent to permit counsel to inform the jury of 
the lump sum amount claimed by the plaintUf or to suggest 
that a certain sum be awarded, while shielding the jury from 
the suggestion that the total amount may be fragmented to 
represent periods of time. These cases reason that discussion of 
a "per diem" amount involves no more speculation than a 
total figure. (See, e.g., Yates v. Wenk (1961) supra, 109 
N.W.2d 828, 831; Louisville &- Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mattingly 
(1960) supra, 339 S.W.2d 155, 161; but see Caley v. Manicke 
(1962) supra, 182 N.E.2d 206, 209; Duguay v. Gelinas (1962) 
) 
178 BEAGLE V. VASOLD [65 C.2<.1 
supra, 182 A.2d 451; Affett v. M'uwaukee d7 Suburban Tratns-
port Corp. (1960) supra, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280; cf. Franco v. 
Fujimoto (1964) supra, 390 P.2d 740, 748-750.)1 Indeed, in a 
Nevada case the court stated that, while it found the reasoning 
of Botta very persuasive, it felt compelled to allow "per 
diem" argument because of the practice in Nevada of telling 
the jury the total amount of damages sought by the plaintiff. 
(Johnson v. Brown (1959) supra, 345 P.2d 754, 759.)8 
Moreover, the jury itself may·calculate the segmented amount 
of a verdict which it has under discussion from the :figures 
available since, in addition to the lump sum amount sought, it 
is customarily told the life expectancy of the plaintiff where it 
is claimed there will be future detriment. . 
Some legal scholars indicate the actual subjective basis for 
decisions which hold the "per diem" argument improper is 
the belief such argument results in excessive verdicts (see, e.g., 
Note (1962) U.Ill.L.F. 269, 274; Note (1960) supra, 33 So.Cal. 
L.Rev. 214, 219) and that courts which prohibit the "per 
diem" argument demonstrate a lack of confidence in the jury 
system (see Note (1961) 14 U.Fla.L.Rev. 189, 191; Note 
(1962) supra, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 612, 625). [13] Even if it can 
be established that larger verdicts result on occasions when the 
, 'per diem" argument is employed, it does not necessarily 
follow that these awards are excessive under the circumstances 
of the particular cases since, as pointed out hereinafter, both 
the trial and the appellate courts have the power and the duty 
to reduce verdicts which are unreasonably large. As was stated 
in one case, "if the evil feared is excessive verdicts, then the 
cure ought to be directed against the product, not the 
practice." (Johnson v. Colglazier (1965) 348 F.2d 420, 425, 
429 (dissenting opinion; the majority opinion in J ohnsan was 
overruled in Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Ins. Co. (5th eire 
1966) sup"a, 365 F.2d 858).) 
Some of the cases which cite the danger of excessive 
damages as a basis for disapproving the "per diem" argu-
ment (e.g., Fat/,ght v. Washam (1959) supra, 329 S.W.2d 588, 
TIn the Franco case it was held there was no incompatibility between 
allowing tIle court to instruct the jury as to the total amount claimed 
by the plaintiff, while refusing to permit the" per diem" argument, be-
cause the purpose of the former ,vas to advise the jury of the limit on 
the amount of its verdict. The court expressly refrained from deeiding 
whether it was proper for counsel to argue for a specific lump sum award. 
(390 P.2d at p. 249, fn. 2.) 
8As set forth above, Nevada is one of the states which leaves the 
question of the propriety of "per diem" argument to the discretion of 
the trial court. 
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604) point to a Florida case (Braddock v. Seaboard Airline 
R.R. Co. (Fla. 1955) 80 So.2d 662, aitd. 96 So.2d 127) in 
which "per diem" damages were argued and the jury 
returned a verdict of $248,439, the exact amount requested by 
plaintiff's counsel. In Seffert v. Los Angeles Tt'ansit Lines, 
Inc. (1961) supra, 56 Cal.2d 498, the same type of argument 
was made and a verdict of $187,903.75 was returned, also 
coinciding with the sum proposed by the attorney. Despite 
isolated instances such as the foregoing, there can be little 
doubt that in the vast majority of cases the jury does not 
follow counsel's suggestions as to damages, regardless of the 
proposed mathematical basis (e.g., Boutang v. Twin City 
Motor Bus Co. (1956) 248 Minn. 240 [80 N.W.2d 30] [counsel 
argued "per diem" damages, asked for $59,405.80, verdict of 
$26,500; see Note (1959) S1lpra, 43 Minn.L.Rev. 832, 834, fn. 
13]), and conversely there are examples of substantial verdicts 
in cases in which there is no indication that counsel suggested 
any figure whatever to the jury as damages. [14] But even 
where the amount awarded is identical to the sum suggested, 
the verdict is not excessive as a matter of law. The circum-
stances may indicate the prescience of the attorney or his 
accurate evaluation of the case. (E.g., see Braddock v. Sea-
.board Airline R.R. Co. (1955) supra, in which the Supreme 
Court of Florida sustained the award in spite of the defend-
ant's contention that it was unreasonably large.) 
Other objections made to the use of a mathematical formula 
are that it produces an illusion of certainty which appeals to 
the jury but can only mislead it (Caley v. Manicke (1962) 
supra, 182 N.E.2d 206, 208) and that it can result in grossly 
magnifying the total damages by shrewd manipulation of, the 
unit of time employed. In AfJett v. Milwaukee & Suburban 
Transport Corp. (1960) supra, 106 N.W.2d 274, 280, it is said 
that the absurdity of using a mathematical formula is demon-
strated by the fact that an attorney could, instead of using a 
day as the unit of time for measurement, ask the jury to 
calculate his client's pain and suffering in terms of seconds. 
Thus, one cent for each second of pain may not seem 
unreasonable, but if the damages were to be calculated on this 
basis it would result in $86.40 for a 24-hour day, $31,536 for 
each year, and an absurdly high figure in toto. 
There are at least two answers to the foregoing objections. 
[15] First, whatever manner of calculation is proposed by 
counselor employed by the jury, the verdict must meet the 
test of reasonableness. The "per diem" argument is only a 
) 
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suggestion as to one method of reaching the goal of reason-
ableness, not a substitute for it. [16] If the jury's award 
does not meet this test, the trial court has the duty to reduce 
it, and the appellate court has the authority to review the 
result.9 To be sure, the standard of reasonableness permits the 
jury a wide latitude of discretion, but there is no convincing 
assurance that the accuracy of its evaluation would be 
enhanced by prohibiting counsel from suggesting that the 
plaintiff's compensation for pain and suffering be measured ill 
aggregates of short periods of time rather than by a total sum 
award for a longer period. 
[11] Second, there exist meaningful safeguards to prevent 
the jury from being misled. As expected of him by his client, 
plaintiff's attorney will urge the jury to award the maximum 
amount of damages which the evidence plausibly justifies, but 
he has the best of reasons for refraining from grossly exagger-
ating hiscbiim since, by doing so, he may so tax the credulity 
of the jury that it will disregard his entire argument. Counsel 
assumes "the risk of overpersuasion" (Brown, J., in HaU v. 
Burkert (1962) 117 Ohio App. 527 [193 N.E.2d 167, 169]). If 
he overstates his claim by the device dsecribed in AjJeH, there 
is nothing to prevent defense counsel from pointing out this 
stratagem or to argue that the amount suggested is excessive 
and emphasize that the jury's duty is to award only a reason· 
able sum as compensation. to [18] More important, the trial 
GIn Thill v. Modem Erecti'lt.g 00. (1965) 272 Minn. 217 [136 N.W.2d 
677], the trial court reduced a jury verdict of $642,400 to $375,000, and 
this was upheld on appeal. While the court agreed" with the trial court 
that the jury reached an excessive verdict by logical application of 
mathematical formulas that swelled the total sum beyond a reasonable 
figure, " it found no fault with the process. only that the basic figures 
used in computation "did not take into account considerations that 
tend to decrease an award." 
In California it has been said, "The trial judge sits as a thirteenth 
juror with the power to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. If he believes the damages awarded by the jury to be 
excessive and the question is presented it becomes his duty to reduce 
them." (Seffert v. Los AngeZes Transit Lines (1961) supra, 56 Cal.2d 
at p. 507.) The appellate court's power in this regard is more limited, 
but a verdict may be reduced on appeal where it is so large as to shock 
the court's sense of justice and raise a presumption that it was the 
result of prejudice. (Johnston v. Long (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 54, 57, 76 
[181 P.2d 645].) 
tOBotta states that defense counsel is placed in an unfair position 
when the "per diem" argument is made because, while he can argue 
that pain and suffering should be assessed at a lesser sum per day or per 
month than that suggested by the plaintiff, this can only fortify the 
implication that the law recognizes the "per diem" method of evalu. 
ation ns valid. The defect in this approach to the problem is that it 
assumes the impropriety of the "per diem" argument. 
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Court can and should instruct the jury that the argument of 
counsel as to the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff is 
llot evidence and that its duty is only to award such damages 
as will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his pain and 
suffering. (See BAJI Nos. 174-L and 174-M.) [19] The 
court may also, if it deems appropriate, advise the jury it is 
not bound by any particular method of calculation in assessing 
damages for pain and suffering. 
Every case which has considered the issue before us has 
emphasized the difficulty faced by a jury in attempting to 
measure in monetary terms compensation for injuries as 
$ubjective as pain, humiliation and embarrassment. The cases 
abound in broad statements such as that the matter is 
entrusted to the" impartial conscience and judgment of jurors 
who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in 
harmony with the evidence," and that they are to award 
"fair and reasonable compensation" and be guided by "their 
observation, experience .and sense of fairness and right." 
(See, e.g, Botta v. Brunner (1958) supra, 138 A.2d at pp. 718-
720.) These homilies provide little assistance to the jury. 
Under some circumstances, the concept of pain and suffering 
may become more meaningful when it is measured in short 
periods of time than over a span of many years, perhaps into 
infinity. The "worth" of pain over a period of decades is 
often more difficult to grasp as a concept of reality than is the 
same experience limited to a day, a week or a month. It is this 
very consideration which underlies much of the controversy 
over the issue before us. [20] The fact that the "per 
diem" argument provides a more explicit comprehension and 
humanization of the plaintiff's predicament to lay jurors 
makes this approach an effective tool in the hands of his 
attorney. This alone is not, however, a sufficient reason to 
condemn it. 
[21] We pause to note that the "per diem" device is not 
beneficial exclusively to plaintiffs seeking damages. It is a 
double-edged sword with equal availability and utility in 
nrgument by defendant's counsel who may employ the tech-
nique of dividing plaintiff '8 total demand into time segments 
in order to illustrate how exaggerated or ludicrous the claim 
maybe. 
[22] Denial of the" per diem" argument deprives counsel 
of the full fruits of effective advocacy on the issue of damages, 
which is not infrequently the crucial conflict in the trial of an 
action for personal injuries. [23] Only the most persuasive 
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reasons justify handcuffing attorneys in the exercise of their 
advocacy within the bQunds of propriety. [24] [See fn. 
11.] We do not find them here.ll 
Defendant and amici curiae urge that even if we do not 
adhere to the Botta prohibitory rule, we should hold that the 
"per diem' ~ argument is not available as a matter of right 
but, rather, the entire question should be subject to the discre-
tion of the trial court. We believe this would be an undesirable 
solution, creating more problems than it would solve. The 
inevitable results would be peremptory challenges to judges on 
the basis of whether or not they were inclined to permit argu-
ment on a mathematical basis, and the proliferation of appeals 
on the complex question of whether the court's discretion was 
abused in a particular case. [25] Existing rules relating to 
the trial court's control ,over the scope of counsel's argument 
are sufficient to protect the integrity of the jury's decision-
making role. There is no justification for holding that the 
"per diem" argument is governed by special standards not 
applicable to other types of argument. 
[26] We come, finally, to the question whether the trial 
court's error in limiting counsel's argument in the present 
case resulted in prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §4%.) Plain-
tiff, a carpenter by trade, was 39 years old at the time of the 
accident.' He was hospitalized for 12 days. He suffered cuts on 
his head and hands, a sliver of wood became lodged under his 
eyelid, and one of his front teeth was chipped in the mishap. 
Subsequently, his vision became impaired. He had not worn 
eyeglasses prior to the accident but was required to obtain ,& 
pair shortly thereafter, and a few weeks after receiving the 
first pair of glasses he suffered another change in his vision, 
requiring a different prescription for his eyeglasses. 
Plaintiff did not have any pains in his back before the acci-
dent, but subsequent tllereto he had severe back pains which 
radiated down his thighs to the knees. He was required to 
wear a back brace and had been unable to work in his trade as 
a carpenter since the accident. A medical doctor testified that 
plaintiff was suffering from a congenital back defect known as 
spondylolisthesis and, although there is some conflict in the 
evidence on the issue, the expert testimony strongly indicates 
11 In holding that counsel may properly suggest to the jury that 
plaintiff's pain and suffering be measured on a "per diem" basis, we 
do not imply that we also approve the so-called "golden rule" argument, 
hy which counsel asks the jurors to place themselves in the plaintiff's 
shoes and to award such damages as they would "charge" to undergo 
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that this condition became symptomatic as a result of the acci-
dent. The doctor also testified that an operation costing $2,000 
would be necessary in order to relieve plaintiff's condition. 
After an examination of the entire record, we are compelled to 
conclude that it is reasonably probable that a result more 
favorable to plaintiff would have been reached if the trial 
court had not limited counsel's argument on the question of 
damages for pain and suffering. (See People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
When prejudicial error appears in the determination of the 
issue of damages, "It has been held that on an appeal from a 
judgment where the evidence as to liability is 'overwhelming' 
a retrial may be limited to the issue of damages. [Citations.] 
[27] Where, however, the evidence as to liability is in sharp 
and substantial conflict, and the damages awarded are so 
grossly inadequate as to indicate a compromise on the issues of 
liability and damages, the case should be remanded for a 
retrial of both issues." (Clifford v. Ruocco (1952) 39 Ca1.2d 
327, 329 [246 P.2d 651] ; see also Leipert v. Honold (1952) 39 
Ca1.2d 462, 467 [247 P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1185] ; Rose v. 
Melody Lane (1952) 39 Ca1.2d 481, 488-489 [247 P.2d 335] ; 
Oary v. Wentzel (1952) 39 Cal.2d 491, 492-493 [247 P.2d 
341] ; Hanwsaki v. Flotho (1952) 39 Cal.2d 602, 604-607 [248 
P.2d 910].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J'J Peek, J'J and Burke, J., 
concurred. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I concur in the judgment. 
In my opinion the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
refusing to allow plaintiff's attorney to state to the jury his 
monetary estimate of an appropriate award for pain and 
suffering. Since the jury must convert pain and suffering into 
dollars and cents, counsel should be permitted to advance any 
reasonable argument as to wilat its decision should be. Since 
there is no mathematical formula for such conversion, how-
ever, an argument that the jury should use such a formula is 
suspect, and an argument that damages for pain and suffering 
should be computed at so much per unit of time is so mi~lead­
ing that it should never be allowed. (See Seffert v. Los 
Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Ca1.2d 498, 509, 513-514 [15 Cal. 
Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d 337], dissenting opinion.) It is one thing 
to urge that in view of all of the evidence of pain and suffer-
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ing including its total duration, some specific sum or range of 
sums is reasonable. It is quite another to urge the jury to use a 
formula such as a mill or penny per second, or penny or nickel 
or dime per minute, or $10 or $20 or $100 per day. None of 
these formulas appears unreasonable on its face, for there is no 
basis in human experience for testing their reasonableness. For 
a year of pain and suffering~ however, they yield damages 
ranging from $3,650 to $315,360, sums that in the light of all 
of the evidence in particular cases might appear to be grossly 
inadequate or grossly excessive. It is therefore unrealistic to 
seek an appropriate award for pain and suifering by the use of 
any so-called per diem formula. Only after counsel has deter .. 
mined how much damages for pain and suifering he is going to 
ask for can he select a per diem ratio to support his .request. 
He could arriye at any amount he wished by adjusting either 
the period of time to be taken as a measure or the amount 
surmised. for the pain and suifering for that period. It is no 
answer that the question-begging in his reasoning may be 
exposed by counterargument or challenged by an equally 
fictive formula leading to a different result. Truth is not 
served by sophistic arguments or clashes between them. (See 
Sefferf v. L08 Angeles TrO/nBilt Line8, 56 Ca1.2d 498, 509, 514 
[15 Ca1.Rp.tr. 161, 364 P.2d 337], dissenting opinion.) 
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